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ABSTRACT
The attorney-client privilege is the most sacred and important
privilege in our legal system. Despite being at the center of daily
practice, the privilege still remains a mystery for many lawyers.
This is primarily because the privilege is not absolute, and there
are certain actions or non-actions that may waive it.
The application of the privilege is further complicated by
electronic discovery, which has both benefits and drawbacks. On
one hand, it has made the practice of law more efficient. On the
other hand, it has made it easier to inadvertently waive the
attorney-client privilege in response to a discovery request. This
iBrief examines attorney-client privilege issues that may arise
during e-discovery, and provides practical guidelines for attorneys
responding to e-discovery requests.

INTRODUCTION
The rapid computerization of the 1990s has altered the litigation
landscape.2 Most businesses have moved away from storing documents in
file cabinets and warehouses as documents are increasingly stored
electronically.3 Consequently, litigators must increasingly respond to
subpoena requests for electronically stored information (ESI). These
requests will continue to increase as experts estimate that nearly one-third
of electronically stored documents remains solely in digital form.4
¶1
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To non-attorneys, responding to a subpoena request for ESI simply
involves inserting a thumb drive into a USB port and copying the requested
files. However, document production entails more than just copying hard
drives and e-mails and sending those copies to opposing counsel. Attorneys
must exercise extreme care in producing ESI because an inadvertent
disclosure of any document may waive attorney-client privilege. This iBrief
aims to balance a theoretical and practical approach to attorney-client issues
that may arise during e-discovery.
¶2

Part I of this iBrief provides an overview of the attorney-client
privilege. Part II discusses the rise of e-discovery. Part III discusses
attorney-client issues that may arise during e-discovery. Part IV provides
practical guidelines for attorneys responding to e-discovery requests.
¶3

I. OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized
privileges for confidential communications.5 Most states codify the
privilege in a statute or rule;6 others still rely on common law.7 Courts have
articulated the elements of the privilege in different ways. The attorneyclient privilege applies only if
¶4

(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.8

The purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
¶5
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broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”9 The privilege “rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to
know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out.”10
The privilege is not absolute and must be narrowly construed since
it impedes full and free discovery of the truth. The Supreme Court notes that
¶6

testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the
fundamental principle that “‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence.” As such, [the privilege] must be strictly construed and
accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.”11

The privilege belongs to the client.12 The attorney must properly
assert the privilege on the client’s behalf and take care to not waive it.13
¶7

At first glance, application of the attorney-client privilege seems
very simple. However, federal courts are not in agreement on the contours
of the privilege. Different circuits analyze the privilege using different
factors. Thus, attorney-client privilege analysis is far from a settled area of
law, especially when it involves ESI.14
¶8

II. THE RISE OF E-DISCOVERY
E-discovery is the discovery of electronically stored information
(ESI). Some estimates show that more than ninety percent of all information
is created in an electronic format.15 As a result, ESI has become the primary
source of evidence in litigation.16 This development has increased the
¶9
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16
See generally id.
10

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 001

overall cost of responding to discovery requests. According to the authors of
the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Report, litigants spent $2.7
billion on e-discovery in 2007, an increase of 43% from 2006.17 This
expenditure is expected to grow by 21%, 20%, and 15% in 2008, 2009, and
2010 respectively.18
E-discovery requires attorneys to alter their typical response to
discovery lest they inadvertently disclose privileged information. This is
because in today’s electronic age, it is fairly easy to mistakenly send
information to opposing counsel due to the sheer volume of information that
Attorneys’ must read during discovery. Attorneys’ responses should change
because there are significant differences between conventional document
and electronic document production.19
¶10

Differences between conventional and electronic discovery exist in
degree, kind, and cost.20 The “volume, number of locations, and data
volatility” is significantly greater in e-discovery than in conventional
discovery.21 For example,
¶11

[a] floppy disk, with 1.44 megabytes, is the equivalent of 720
typewritten pages of plain text. A CD-ROM, with 650 megabytes, can
hold up to 325,000 typewritten pages. One gigabyte is the equivalent
of 500,000 typewritten pages. Large corporate computer networks
create backup data measured in terabytes or 1,000,000 megabytes:
each terabyte represents the equivalent of 500 [m]illion typewritten
pages of plain text.22

One article estimates that a company with one hundred employees
sending an average of 25 e-mails daily produces about 625,000 e-mails
yearly.23 Another study showed that
¶12
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George Socha & Tom Gelbman, A Look at the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Survey,
L. TECH. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=120242364
6479.
18
Id.
19
Richard Van Duizend, Conference of Chief Justices: Guidelines for State
Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information, NAT’L
CENTER FOR ST. CTS., vi (Aug. 2006),
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf.
20
Id. at v, vi.
21
Id. at v.
22
Id. (citations omitted).
23
Id. Many of the statistics in the Conference of Chief Justices Guidelines are
condensed directly from a presentation on electronic discovery by Ken Withers,
former Senior Judicial Education Attorney at the Federal Judicial Center, to the
National Workshop for United States Magistrate Judges on June 12, 2002.
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[i]n 1998, the U.S. Postal Service processed approximately 1.98 billion
pieces of mail. That year, there were approximately 47 million e-mail
users in the United States who sent an estimated 500 million e-mail
messages per day, for a total of approximately 182.5 billion e-mail
messages per year—more than 90 times as many messages as the U.S.
Postal Service handled the same year.24

The e-discovery process, already burdening attorneys with a
voluminous number of e-mails to sift through, is further complicated when
discoverable e-mails are automatically deleted by the hosting e-mail
servers.25 And most complicated of all, deleted data is not necessarily
deleted. Rather, the computer has been instructed to ignore the data marked
deleted and overwrite it only if space is needed.26
¶13

It is therefore possible that deleted data exists and is retrievable,
unbeknownst to its custodian.27 Consequently, many attorneys now request
that opposing counsel turn over all e-mails, including deleted e-mails. Some
attorneys go a step further, requiring forensic computer experts to examine
the hard drives in search of deleted e-mails. This has caused the e-discovery
process to become increasingly burdensome and costly.
¶14

Another contributing factor to the burdensome nature of ediscovery is the existence of metadata. Metadata is information embedded
in an electronic file about that file, including author and date of creation.28 It
is increasingly common for attorneys to request that information in
discovery. Complying with this request presents a variety of problems.29
¶15

The final and most important difference between conventional and
electronic discovery is the cost. Because attorneys increasingly hire
computer forensic experts to sort through the ESI, the cost of litigation has
increased astronomically. One client reportedly spent about $6.2 million to
restore ninety-three backup tapes.30 Cost is arguably the most litigated ediscovery issue. And although not extensively explored in this iBrief, a brief
discussion of the leading federal case on cost—Zubulake v. UBS Warburg31
—is necessary; as it clarifies the difference between conventional discovery
and e-discovery.
¶16

Zubulake establishes three considerations for determining which
party should bear the cost of discovery: (1) accessibility, (2) less costly
¶17
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means of obtaining the information requested, and (3) cost-benefit analysis
based on the facts of the case. Zubulake, among other cases, prompted the
2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the
previous rules, the costs of complying with the discovery request were
presumed to be borne by the responding party.32 Under the post-Zubulake
amendments, “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”33 However, a court may still
order discovery upon a showing of good cause.34 Some commentators have
opined that the new rules do not help courts decide who should bear the
burden of costs.35 Nevertheless, the amendments underscore that ediscovery is different from traditional discovery.
As discussed above, e-discovery goes beyond the mere copying and
saving of data. Parties responding to e-discovery requests must review the
data, ensuring that only relevant and non-privileged information is sent to
opposing counsel. Due to the burdensome nature of sorting through all
electronic data, most attorneys outsource this task to companies who
specialize in e-discovery. These companies use sophisticated software to
collect, filter, process, and review the data. Some companies go a step
beyond merely collecting data, sorting it by key words such as attorney and
client names. However, this does not eliminate attorneys’ responsibility to
review documents to ensure that no privileged information is inadvertently
sent to opposing parties.
¶18

III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & E-DISCOVERY
Although attorney-client privilege belongs solely to clients,
attorneys have an ethical duty to assert the privilege on their clients’
behalf.36 As technology has made responding to discovery requests easier, it
has also become easier to waive the attorney-client privilege without
intending to do so.37 This error is particularly common because there is no
consensus among the circuits as to when inadvertent disclosure
automatically results in waiver of privilege.
¶19
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See id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)
(discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) prior to 2006 amendments)).
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
34
Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283.
35
See generally Duizend, supra note 19, at 7.
36
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 86 (2000).
37
See John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent
Disclosure–Federal Law, 159 A.L.R. FED. 153 (2000).
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A. Varying Approaches to the Inadvertent Disclosure Problem
Whether an inadvertent disclosure of ESI waives attorney-client
privilege has engendered three different schools of thought. The first treats
inadvertent disclosure as an automatic waiver. The second holds that an
inadvertent disclosure never results in an automatic waiver. The third takes
a middle-ground, using a multi-factor test to determine whether the
privilege has been waived.
¶20

1. Jurisdictions in Which Inadvertent Disclosure Automatically Waives
Attorney-Client Privilege
¶21
Courts subscribing to the first school of thought—that any
involuntary disclosure of privilege automatically waives the privilege38—
take an objective view of inadvertent disclosure, holding the privilege
waived irrespective of the number of documents disclosed. For example, in
In re Sealed Case,39 the D.C. Circuit held that the disclosure, although
inadvertent, automatically waived the attorney-client privilege:
Although the attorney-client privilege is of ancient lineage and
continuing importance, the confidentiality of communications covered
by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of the
privilege lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater protection
to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant.
We therefore agree with those courts which have held that the
privilege is lost “even if the disclosure is inadvertent.”40

Generally, courts that follow this rule do not consider the number of
documents waived or whether immediate steps were taken to correct the
error. Once a document has been mistakenly turned over, attorney-client
privilege is considered waived. Thus, the privilege is waived in these
jurisdictions even when “immediate steps were taken to correct the error [of
inadvertent disclosure].”41 The court elaborated on this point:
¶22

38

FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va.
1991). Cf. Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int’l Holdings (U.S.) Inc.,
111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (addressing case law that does not involve
claims of inadvertent disclosure and suggesting that an instance of inadvertent
disclosure can be so insignificant as to not constitute a waiver); Georgetown
Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(acknowledging that federal courts are split on the issue of whether privilege is
waived in the event of an inadvertent disclosure).
39
In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
40
Id. at 980 (citation omitted).
41
Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 461
(D.D.C. 1992).
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To find waiver in these circumstances may seem a harsh
result . . . . There is a tension between the principle of unfettered
judicial access to all relevant evidence on the one hand, and on the
other, the policy supporting evidentiary privileges, which encourage
complete candor between client and lawyer, as well as thorough case
preparation that is essential to the adversary system. Liberal
application of waiver discourages organizations from broadly labeling
materials “privileged.” The more documents that are so labeled, the
greater the likelihood of an inadvertent disclosure that will render all
related communications discoverable. “[I]f a client wishes to preserve
the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications like jewels—if not crowned jewels.”42

In the eyes of this court, once the document has been seen, the
privilege is considered waived. Attorneys who frequently find themselves in
forums like the D.C. Circuit, which follow the automatic waiver rule,
should take extra care to prevent inadvertent disclosure; for inadvertent
disclosures will always waive the attorney-client privilege in these
jurisdictions. Practical tips to avoid inadvertent disclosure are discussed in
Part IV of this iBrief.43
¶23

2. Jurisdictions in Which Inadvertent Disclosure Never Waives AttorneyClient Privilege
¶24
As mentioned above, courts are not consistent in finding waiver of
attorney-client privilege. While some courts find automatic waiver, others
adhere to the “no waiver rule,” holding that the attorney-client privilege can
never be waived in e-discovery through inadvertent disclosure of privileged
documents. These courts often presume that negligence of counsel during
discovery cannot constitute waiver because the privilege belongs to the
client, and only the client can waive it. In these jurisdictions, not even an
attorney’s negligence in failing to review documents will waive the
privilege.44
In Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.,45 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held that an attorney’s inadvertent
production of privileged letters in a patent infringement action did not
constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege.46 The court stated that
attorneys are “taught from first year law school that waiver imports the
¶25

42

Id. at 461–62 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
See discussion infra Part IV.
44
See, e.g., Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D.
12, 21 (D. Neb. 1983) (finding that, while negligence on an attorney’s part is
unacceptable, it is not necessary to impose sanctions)).
45
Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
46
Id. at 955.
43
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‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”47 The court
reasoned that “[i]nadvertent production is the antithesis of that concept.”48
While the court agreed that counsel might have been negligent in failing to
go through the letters before production, the court nevertheless refused to
find waiver of privilege, affirming that courts should require more than
mere negligence of counsel before finding waiver.49 Attorneys who find
themselves in such a forum can consider themselves lucky: waiver will
never be found so long as it is the attorneys’ or their agents’ (usually an ediscovery company) negligence that results in the inadvertent disclosure.
However, just because attorneys find themselves in such a forum does not
mean they should fail to review documents before handing them over to
opposing counsel. As discussed in Part IV of this iBrief, this behavior may
result in some ethical violations of an attorney’s duty to represent clients
diligently.
3. Jurisdictions Employing a Multi-Factor Analysis to Determine if
Attorney-Client Privilege is Waived by Inadvertent Disclosures
¶26
The third and final school of thought adheres to a middle-ground
approach. This approach, known as the Lois Sportswear rule, uses a factintensive analysis to determine the outcome of privileged cases. 50 Some of
the factors considered in evaluating whether an inadvertent disclosure
constitutes a waiver include: (1) reasonableness of the precautions taken to
prevent inadvertent disclosures, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3)
the scope of discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) the
overriding issue of fairness.51 No one factor is determinative, but, as one
court opines, “perhaps the most important circumstance is the number of
documents involved. As the number of documents grows, so too must the
level of effort increase to avoid an inadvertent disclosure.”52
The Fourth Circuit has subscribed to this middle-ground approach.53
In FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., a United States District
¶27

47

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
49
Id.
50
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51
FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 482 (E.D. Va.
1991) (citing Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105); see also Tri-County Paving,
Inc. v. Ashe Cnty., No. 5:99-CV-105, 2000 WL 1811606, at *3–4 (W.D.N.C.
Oct. 5, 2000)); Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989).
52
FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va.
1991).
53
See id. at 482; see also McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D.
163, 167 (D. Md. 1998).
48
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Court in Virginia court opted for a factor-based test. The court found that
both the automatic and no-waiver rules were too extreme. The court
reasoned that
inadvertent disclosure is a species of waiver and must be analyzed in
that light. Waivers must typically be intentional or knowing acts.
Inadvertent disclosures are, by definition, unintentional acts, but
disclosures may occur under circumstances of such extreme or gross
negligence as to warrant deeming the act of disclosure to be
intentional.54 Put another way, “[i]t is not too much to insist that if a
client wishes to preserve the privilege under such circumstances, he
must take some affirmative action to preserve confidentiality. . .
[t]aking or failing to take precautions may be considered as bearing on
intent.”55

The court opted for a fact-intensive analysis by looking at the facts
in the case and how they influenced the five factors mentioned above.
¶28

In Scott v. Glickman,56 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina held that the attorney-client privilege was
waived because of a party’s failure to put measures in place to prevent
inadvertent disclosures. The court based its conclusion on several facts:
document production was not very onerous; there were no time constraints
impacting the document production; the attorney did not spend an extensive
amount of time trying to prevent inadvertent production of privileged
materials; and no special efforts were made to ensure confidentiality.57
¶29

An earlier case, Parkway Gallery Furniture v. Kittinger
Pennsylvania House Group, Inc.,58 held that the defendant waived the
attorney-client privilege for failing to take precautions that would have
prevented disclosure. The court reasoned that “[a] large number of
inadvertent disclosures in comparison to [only a small] number of
documents reviewed shows lax, careless, and inadequate procedures.”59
However, the court limited the scope of the privilege, holding that an
inadvertent disclosure of documents did not require further disclosure of
other privileged documents relating to the same subject matter:
¶30

54

Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 482 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings
727 F.2d 1352, 1352 (4th Cir. 1984).
55
Id.
56
199 F.R.D. 174 (E.D.N.C. 2001).
57
Id.; see also O’Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding
attorney-client privilege waived because the attorney had made no special efforts to
ensure confidentiality).
58
116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
59
Id. at 51 (citing Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
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The general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific
communication but also the subject matter of it in other
communications is not appropriate in the case of inadvertent
disclosure. In a proper case of inadvertent disclosure, the waiver
should cover only the specific document in issue. This ruling limits the
risk to parties in major discovery cases and still makes them, and not
the Court, accountable for maintaining confidentiality.60

The middle-ground approach appears to be the most reasonable and
appealing analysis of the three mentioned herein. The Supreme Court
appears to agree; it has repeatedly held—albeit not in this context—that
privilege issues should be decided on a case-by-case basis.61 The Court
stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States that “[w]hile such a ‘case-by-case’
basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the
boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the
Rules.”62 And because attorney-client privilege issues are presented in
various forms, a factor-based test would ensure that the spirit of the rules—
which is to encourage frank communications between attorneys and their
clients—will be upheld.
¶31

Several states have realized that the case law on e-discovery is not
consistent. Consequently, the Conference of Chief Justices has published
guidelines to assist courts in considering issues related to e-discovery.63 The
guidelines state that judges should consider the following factors in an
inadvertent disclosure case: the total volume of information produced by the
responding party, the amount of privileged information disclosed, the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information, the promptness of the actions taken to notify the
receiving party and otherwise remedy the error, and the reasonable
expectations and agreements of counsel.64 These factors mirror the Lois
Sportswear factor test. Their goal is the same: to determine waiver of
attorney-client privilege on a case-by-case basis.
¶32

B. Inadvertent Disclosure of Metadata
Metadata is “information describing the history, tracking, or
management of an electronic document.”65 It is information about
documents that is recorded by a user’s computer to assist the computer in
¶33

60

Id. at 52.
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); see also United States
v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980).
62
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396–97 (1981).
63
See generally Duizend, supra note 19.
64
Id. at 8.
65
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
61
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retrieving the document at a later date.66 Metadata is often hidden, invisible,
and normally inaccessible by the computer’s user.67 Examples of metadata
include comments, edit dates and history, authorship, dates sent and
received, et cetera.68 Metadata is simply “data about data.”69
Metadata is increasingly the subject of litigation. In a case
stemming from a city police officer’s employment discrimination suit
against the city, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a police officer’s
public record requests of electronically formatted records included the
entire electronic record, even its metadata.70 In that case, the police officer’s
requested his supervisor’s notes, which documented his work performance.
71
After reviewing the paper documents, the police officer requested the
metadata because he suspected the documents were backdated, which the
City of Phoenix denied.72 The court held that a public entity that maintains a
public record in electronic format must disclose all information in response
to a public records request, including embedded metadata.73
¶34

But does this mean that metadata is to be treated the same as
ordinary data in the attorney-client privilege context? In other words, what
happens to metadata if it is inadvertently sent to opposing counsel in a
discovery request? Does this mean the attorney-client privilege is waived?
¶35

The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility has held that attorneys may mine for metadata embedded in
responses to discovery requests.74 Instead of limiting its holding to
inadvertent disclosures, the committee only limited its holding’s scope to
metadata that was not obtained in a “fraudulent, deceitful, or otherwise
improper” manner.75 As a result, an attorney who inadvertently receives
metadata embedded in privileged electronic documents can argue that the
privilege has been waived.
¶36

Contrary to the ABA’s decision, some state bars have required
attorneys to return privileged metadata transmitted inadvertently.76 These
¶37

66

See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 4.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Ned T. Himmelrich, Metadata: Data About Data, MD. B.J., May–June 2010,
at 34, 36.
70
Lake v. City of Phoenix, 218 P.3d 1004, 1008 (Ariz. 2009).
71
Id. at 1004–05.
72
Id. at 1004.
73
Id.
74
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-422 (2006).
75
Id.
76
See Himmelrich, supra note 69, at 36.
67
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states base their rules primarily on the 2006 amendments to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides that
[i]f information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege
or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the
claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim
and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has;
[and] must not use or disclose the information until the claim is
resolved.77

In the District of Columbia—one of the jurisdictions that does not
follow the ABA’s decision—attorneys may not mine for metadata if the
attorney has actual knowledge that the data was sent inadvertently.78 New
York goes one step further, not requiring actual knowledge—just
inadvertent submission—to prohibit an attorney’s use of privileged
metadata.79 Attorneys should check their respective bar rules to ensure that
they are in compliance with all ethical requirements regarding mining and
use of metadata.
¶38

IV. PRACTICAL TIPS TO AVOID INADVERTENTLY
WAIVING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Claw-Back Clause or Quick Peek Agreements
Attorneys should enter into claw-back agreements prior to the
commencement of e-discovery. Claw-back agreements are formal
agreements that prevent the attorney-client privilege from being waived by
an inadvertent disclosure of privileged information.80 Rather the receiving
party must return the privileged material to the responding party.
¶39

Quick peek agreements allow attorneys to look at each party’s
entire data before production. Attorneys then designate items that are
responsive to the discovery request and items that are privileged.81
Attorneys should ensure that such agreements address electronic documents
in general and metadata specifically.
¶40

77

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
D.C. Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 341, available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm.
79
NYCLA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 738 (2008), available at
http://nyclamail.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1154_0.pdf.
80
Van Duizend, supra note 19, at 9. See generally Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb.
19, 2002) (noting that court cannot compel the disclosure of privileged
communications in claw-back arrangement).
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
78

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 001

Claw-back clauses and quick peek agreements might not
necessarily guarantee protection against claims of waiver. For example,
opposing counsel may renege on a claw-back agreement and argue that
privilege is waived because opposing counsel has already seen the
documents, and thus they would no longer uphold any claw-back
provisions.82 Attorneys should enter these agreements knowing that while
most courts would uphold them, some might make an exception when
counsel has already seen the alleged confidential information.
¶41

Also, some legal experts have said that claw-back agreements
violate the fundamental premise of an attorney’s duty to represent clients
zealously.83 By voluntarily entering into such agreements, attorneys are
tying their hands, so to speak. The prudent measure may be to seek clients’
consent before entering into such agreements.
¶42

B. Discovery Hearing or Pre-Trial Conference
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) requires parties to confer
early in litigation to attempt to develop a discovery plan.84 Attorneys should
take advantage of such pre-trial conferences to address potential disputes
over electronic discovery.
¶43

Some commentators have opined that attorneys should voluntarily
submit to a pre-trial conference to determine the disclosure of ESI, the
manner of disclosure, and a specific schedule with a timeline.85 Unlike
claw-back clauses, in which attorneys voluntarily enter into agreements,
pre-trial conferences are more formal and take place before a judge. A
judge’s involvement in the pre-trial conference may provide legitimacy to
the agreement should a dispute arise concerning its validity.
¶44

82

See generally In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (nearly
any disclosure of the communication or document, even inadvertent, waives the
privilege).
83
SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 37 (“[C]ounsel has an ethical duty to
zealously guard the confidences and secrets of the client. It is possible that
questions could arise as to whether voluntarily entering into a ‘clawback’
production could constitute a violation of Model Rules of Professional Conduct
1.1 (requiring a lawyer to use diligence and care in representation) or Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 (protection of client secrets and confidences)
if the manner of the production results in later waivers of privileges and
protections. While this result may seem remote, it has already arisen in the
content of inadvertent productions.” (citing D.C. Bar Ethics Op. No. 256
(1995) (examining whether actions of producing counsel violated standard),
available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/
opinion256.cfm)).
84
See id. (citations omitted).
85
Id.
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Prior to attending a pre-trial conference, attorneys should consult
with their clients’ technology departments regarding data preservation.86 In
particular, attorneys should ask IT personnel how much time and resources
are needed to retrieve data. Having this information available prepares
attorneys to better discuss the issue of cost allocation when it arises during
pre-trial conferences.
¶45

Attorneys attending a pre-trial conference should also be prepared
to discuss the manner of production. For example, the parties might discuss
whether the data would be copied to disks; the steps to take to ensure that
ESI is not negligently destroyed; the procedures to be followed in the event
ESI is inadvertently disclosed; the list of persons most knowledgeable about
each party’s computer systems, cost allocation, and any other pertinent
information that may affect the discovery response may be discussed.87
¶46

Lastly, attorneys should keep privilege logs documenting each
privileged document and a brief description of each document. Keeping a
privilege log allows attorneys to be prepared to address inadvertent
disclosure of privileged information. Others have suggested counsel have
documents ready for in camera inspection during a pre-trial conference.88
Either way, it is better to be prepared to discuss inadvertent disclosure early
in the discovery process, rather than catching up later in the midst of trial.
¶47

C. Third-Party Protective Orders
As discussed above, attorneys may outsource data retrieval to ediscovery companies.89 It is possible that the staff may unintentionally
include privileged information in the data sent to requesting counsel. The
parties should therefore agree that attorney-client privilege is not waived
when information is inadvertently disclosed by human error, especially
when a third-party is conducting the review of ESI.
¶48

86

Id. (citing Keir v. Unumprovident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781, 2003 WL
21997747, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003) (noting counsel’s failure to inform
court of burdens and technological issues regarding preservation order)); see
also Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77–79 (D.D.C. 2003)
(reciting failures of agency’s attorneys to properly communicate preservation
order to agency and holding that agency committed contempt of court by
reformatting hard drives and erasing e-mail backup tapes after it received notice
of the order).
87
See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 9.
88
Id.
89
See discussion supra Part II.
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D. Remove Metadata
In a recent publication, the ABA recommended attorneys remove
metadata before e-mailing files.90 Attorneys can also use a third-party tool
such as Metadata Assistant to reduce accidental exposure.91 Microsoft also
offers a free “Remove Hidden Data” utility.92 One way to remove metadata
in Word is to go to the Office button, choose “Prepare” and then “Inspect
Document” to check for metadata.93 All comments and edits in word
documents should be deleted and avoid using the redlining function in word
processing documents as much as possible.94 Attorneys should also delete
comments and disable the undo/redo options in WordPerfect documents.95
¶49

Attorneys should note that they are ethically prohibited from
altering documents that have potential evidentiary value.96 They should
check their respective ethical rules to ensure compliance with the rules
governing removal of metadata.
¶50

E. Attorney Review
The most effective way to prevent inadvertent disclosure is for
attorneys to review all electronic documents before sending them to
opposing counsel. This is an obvious recommendation, but so often
attorneys do not review the documents because the data’s sheer size is
intimidating. It is imperative that attorneys spend time and effort reviewing
these documents before production. As stated earlier, one factor courts
consider in determining waiver is the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosures.97 Whether the precautions taken
were sufficient to prevent inadvertent disclosures depends on the time and
effort expended by the attorneys. Thus, it is important that attorneys spend
the time required to review the documents, no matter how tedious or
uninteresting the process may be.
¶51

90

11 Steps to Protect Client Data, YOUR ABA (June 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/201006/article02.html.
91
Donna Payne, Metadata - Are you Protected?,
http://www.payneconsulting.com/pub_books/articles/pdf/MidwestBarAssociatio
nConferenceMetadataHandout.pdf.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442, at 5
(2006). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2006) (“A
lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value.”).
97
See discussion supra Part III, Section A.
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CONCLUSION
As e-discovery continues to pervade modern litigation, attorneys
should better prepare themselves to handle attorney-client privilege issues
that emerge out of our society’s increasing reliance on technology.
Attorneys have plenty of resources and tools to assist them in ensuring that
their clients’ confidences are kept. Technological ignorance is not a viable
excuse.
¶52

